Learn more. In the second half of the third Critique, Kant develops a new form of judgment peculiar to organisms: teleological judgment. In the Appendix to this text, Kant argues that we must regard the final, unconditioned end of creation as human freedom, due to reason's demand that we regard nature as a system of ends. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of this argument, according to which judgments of freedom within nature are possible as instances of teleological judgment.
Just as individual organisms are to be regarded as governed by supersensible teleological laws, so too is nature as a whole to be regarded as given laws from a supersensible ground. This supersensible ground in the case of nature as a whole is freedom. Freedom and teleological judgments are to be regarded as unifiable with mechanism in the supersensible, and we are to subordinate mechanical explanations to teleological judgments as well as to freedom.
They require a special form of teleological judgment in which the idea of the purposively ordered whole is the ground of our cognition of that object and its parts. The teleological form of judgment specific to organisms brings with it some theological and moral implications, which Kant draws out most explicitly in the Appendix to this section. Devoting attention to these connections will lead to greater understanding and appreciation of the influence of this Critique during and immediately following Kant's life.
The third Critique ignited the imaginations of Kant's contemporaries and led to that fruitful and exciting period of philosophy in the immediate aftermath of the Critical philosophy, a period in which the concepts of organisms, aesthetics, unity, nature, and freedom were paramount. This Critique was of crucial importance for Schiller, Goethe, Schelling, Hegel, and other Romantics and Idealists because Kant addresses the concerns that were at the forefront of the minds of these scholars. According to Kant, we must consider there to be a supersensible conceptual ground of an organism that gives purposive laws to nature, and we are to regard this order of laws as reconcilable with the order of mechanism.
Kant’s Legacy for German Idealism: Versions of Autonomy
In the same way, supersensible freedom can also be regarded as giving laws to nature, and we are to regard these laws of freedom as reconcilable with mechanism. This opens up a way to regard human ends as realizable within sensible nature. We must consider human freedom be the unconditioned final end of creation, which governs nature as an organizing principle.
Thus is the gulf between the phenomenal realm of nature and the noumenal realm of freedom overcome. I show in this section how Kant's claims about natural ends can apply to nature as a whole, which must be regarded as having its own end and purposive structure.
The conclusions Kant reaches regarding organisms as purposive can be applied, in a qualified way, to nature as a purposive system.
Kant's system of nature and freedom : selected essays
These passages show both that reason demands that we see nature as a purposive system with an unconditioned end, and that we nevertheless cannot specify such an end with the resources of theoretical philosophy alone. There are two obstacles to specifying this end: First, all natural ends are conditioned and so cannot serve as final ends; second, nature does not appear to be purposive for human ends.
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In Section 4 , I show how these obstacles are resolved in the Appendix by regarding freedom as an instance of teleological lawgiving. First, freedom, as the final end of the human being, connects nature to the unconditioned end, the moral law, thus grounding nature as a system of ends Section 4. As an instance of teleological lawgiving, freedom is to be regarded as unifiable with mechanism in the supersensible, and mechanical explanation is to be subordinated to freedom, in the same way that it is subordinated to teleology Section 4.
And finally, in Section 4. Kant's resulting conception of freedom is a novel development in his Critical philosophy, and it does indeed overcome the gulf between freedom and nature in an unprecedented way. In Section 2. Many of Kant's claims about organisms, inasmuch as they are applied to organisms in virtue of such purposive organization, can be applied to nature as a whole. We will see further on in Section 3 that these two ways of conceiving of the source of nature's organization maps on to Kant's distinction between the ultimate end of nature and the final end of creation.
And in Section 2. We must assume that every object in nature is possible with respect to one principle or the other. In other words, we could not begin to understand the individual parts of an organism, for instance, the ion pumps in a cell, if we did not see these parts in the light of the hierarchy of ends in the organism.
It would seem odd, miraculous even, that this hunk of matter sustains itself in the same form with all of these complicated processes going on; the ion pumps would be one of a large number of serendipitous processes that maintain the organism in its incredibly unlikely state.
An organism seems in this way impossible to us unless we introduce the notion of purposiveness. Once we do, we see the organism is both intelligible and possible: We can understand the working of its parts and give an account about the way it endures and is organized. The issue to be resolved in the case of organisms is not merely that there are contingencies in nature that must be removed by the assumption of some governing law. Rather, the problem is that we must employ the concept of a natural end as that which is required to even begin to investigate organic objects, and this concept does not fit into our mechanical models of explanation.
The radical contingency that would result were we to simply give up these concepts is unacceptable in that it would be scientifically debilitating. It is not problematic to assume—in fact, we need to assume—that there are mechanical causes of the apparent contingencies in inorganic nature and that we can increase our knowledge of these causes through further investigation into mechanics.
But according to Kant, we cannot assume that our understanding of organic objects can be increased through a further investigation into mechanical causes unless we first consider them natural ends. Consider the following passage: For if one adduces, for example, the structure of the bird, the hollowness of its bones, the placement of its wings for movement of its tail for steering, and so forth, one says that given the mere nexus effectivus in nature, without the help of a special kind of causality, namely, that of ends nexus finalis , this is all in the highest degree contingent: That is, that nature, considered as mere mechanism, could have formed itself in a thousand different ways without hitting precisely upon the unity in accordance with such a rule and that it is therefore only outside the concept of nature, not within it, that one could have even the least ground a priori for hoping to find such a principle.
The sense of contingency at play in the organization of the bird is not mechanical contingency. It is the fit between mechanical nature operating according to the laws of efficient causation, on the one hand, and this purposive unity, on the other, which appears contingent and requires explanation.
Note that this contingency of fit does not require mechanical indeterminacy, because full determination by efficient causality does not preclude surprising conformity to some other kind of law. Organisms thereby demand an explanation that cannot be satisfied by the order of mechanism, due to their purposive organization. We must regard nature as a whole as similar to a natural end insofar as it is purposively organized.
Kant's Legacy - The Philosophers' Magazine
The reason we cannot simply stop at the organism, presumably, is that in order to understand the organism, one must understand it in its natural context. That is, one must look at the purposive connections of the organism to its surrounding environment in order to understand the purposiveness of its form. One cannot, for example, understand bees without understanding their purposive connection to flowers, or understand the digestive system of cattle without understanding its purposive connection to grass.
The external relations of purposiveness among natural objects are the internal relations of purposiveness within nature as a whole. Angela Breitenbach similarly argues that nature's organization as a purposive unity is like an organism—inexplicable in terms of mechanical causation alone, due the part—whole relationship between an organism and its environment. Rather, this judgment of nature as a purposive system is a result of reason's demand to seek teleological closure. Nevertheless, nature as a whole is to be regarded as a purposively organized system, and claims made about organisms on account of their purposive organization may cautiously be applied to nature as a whole.
This conception of organisms as requiring a special form of explanation is laid out in detail in the Analytic of Teleological Judgment, where Kant contrasts the purposiveness of organisms with that of artifacts. This contrast, however, is in tension with Kant's claim that we cannot understand organisms except as intentionally designed by a supreme being, a claim he makes repeatedly in the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment.
In this section, I show that this tension can be resolved by a proper understanding of the contrast between organisms and artifacts. An organism requires teleological judgment, but not because we regard it as an artifact. As Kant maintains in the Analytic that an organism organizes itself is precisely what distinguishes it from an artifact, which is organized by an artificer—so why is Kant now insisting that we cannot conceive of an organism without supposing an intelligent cause?
This puzzle can be resolved by careful attention to Kant's language.
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In the Analytic, Kant is concerned with distinguishing organisms from artifacts in our immediate cognition of those objects, whereas in the Dialectic, Kant is concerned with our cognition of the origin or possibility of organisms. An organism organizes itself and is distinguished from an artifact in that it is a natural end, and therefore, its purposiveness is internal to it.
But as organized objects, organisms and artifacts both require a concept of the whole as the ground of the intelligibility of the object and its parts, the organization and the workings of the parts being unintelligible without such a concept of the whole. Artifacts e. Kant discusses these points in the Analytic. We are thereby immediately led to the question: whence this concept?
But then, in judging the possibility of such an object, I am immediately thrown back onto the question of the source of this idea. I must assume that this cause is not within nature—organisms are not artifacts—but outside of nature; thus, we must think of the determining ground of the individual organism as outside of nature. I posit a designer for these natural ends, but can say little about this designer, except that it is intelligent and outside of nature. This argument applies not just to individual organisms but also to the whole of nature as a system of ends.
It too is purposively ordered, as mentioned above, and it clearly has no sensible, determined cause. Nature is thought as organized according to an idea, and again, whence this idea? And, like an organism, we are compelled to regard it regulatively as the product of an intelligent cause. It is crucial, however, to see that for Kant, we are compelled to think of nature as akin to a natural end , rather than an artifact.
Any purposively organized object requires that we think of the source of its organizing idea. For artifacts, that source is sensible; for organisms and nature as a whole, we are compelled to assume the source is supersensible, because there is no external, sensible source of that idea. In other words, it is the purposive order of nature that by itself requires the assumption of a supreme author; the antinomy which involves the possible unification of that purposive order with the mechanical is a distinct problem with its own, distinct solution.
The exact manner of the setup and resolution of this antimony is the subject of much scholarly debate and outside the scope of this paper. Here, I take for granted that the antinomy is between the two regulative principles of judgment and is resolved by the appeal to a supersensible ground of nature in which the mechanical order of explanation of nature can be reconciled with and subordinated to the purposive order of nature.
This chain of reasoning does not rely on the above appeal to an intelligent artificer of nature, which is posited to explain the possibility of purposive objects in nature, given the limits of our understanding, rather than the connection and compatibility of this teleological causation with mechanism. The possibility of the unification of the two principles in the supersensible is enough to ensure that our cognition of nature as both purposively ordered and mechanically ordered is possible, that is, not contradictory.
And so we can continue to investigate nature with both principles. It is not enough to say that there is a unified supersensible ground of nature, rather, one must say that these two modes of conceiving nature can themselves be unified in a complete understanding of nature. We must do this in order to be confident that nature is thoroughly lawful, which our disjunctive approach to nature would seem to belie. Similarly, we must be able to explain what is lacking in our own understanding such that nature is unified in this way and yet we do not experience it as such.
The contrast of our own, discursive intellect with the intuitive intellect explains the limits of our understanding in such a satisfactory way. We therefore assume a supersensible ground, in which teleology and mechanism are unified and which could be cognized as thoroughly lawful by an intuitive intellect.
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Note that Kant does not appeal directly to a designer in this resolution to the antinomy. And so we see that an author of the world is only invoked, and yet is decisively invoked, as an integral part of the conception of nature as purposive. Therefore, one ought to keep separate these two presuppositions: that of a designer, invoked to secure our cognition of the possibility of nature and natural ends as purposive, and that of an intuitive understanding of the supersensible ground of nature, which is invoked to secure the possible compatibility of that purposiveness with mechanism.
To sum up so far, discussed above are three main conclusions reached in the course of the Critique of Teleological Judgment, and all three can be applied to nature as a whole. Second, due to the limitations of our cognitive faculties and as the ground of our cognition of the possibility of that object, we must assume that the organizing idea of such an object is given by a designer, or an intelligent author.
Third, we may suppose there to be a thoroughgoing unity of the supersensible teleological laws and mechanical causation; such unity can be regarded as residing in the supersensible and comprehended by an intuitive intellect. We can apply these in turn to nature as a whole.
Like an organism, nature is to be regarded as a teleologically ordered whole. As a purposive whole, it also requires the assumption of a supreme author as the origin of its organizing idea. And, finally, we must suppose the teleological laws that order and structure nature emerge from a supersensible realm in which mechanism and teleology can be regarded as fully unified, and that mechanism is subordinated to that teleological law giving.
It is this final conclusion, that of supersensible unity and the subordination of mechanism to the teleological laws of nature as a whole, that leads to Kant's claims regarding the reunification of nature and freedom, specifically when freedom is regarded as the end of nature as a whole to which mechanism is subordinated.